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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
strong policy arguments and said that there shall be no privity
requirement. As to a noxious and dangerous article they said the
same, but have yet to have such a case. Beyond this the court has
negated the effect of the privity requirement only by resort to other
legal concepts, such as the third party beneficiary and the agency
relationship. Unfortunately these concepts are awkward to apply,
often requiring fictions or at least extention of the concepts into a
new area. While this may be expedient in particular cases, eventu-
ally the application of these "borrowed" concepts may prove unwork-
able, especially where the equities of the case demand denial of
recovery.
The U.C.C.'s provision is a practical and realistic extention of the
warranty obligation, based upon strong policy arguments; such an
approach requires no torturing of existing legal principles, and pro-
vides a high degree of predictability. There is no obstacle to the
court making this equitable exception to the privity requirement"-
when the injury is inflicted on someone in the buyer's household. Cases
such as Martin v. J. C. Penney could be brought directly within such
an exception, without resort to other legal concepts.
JAMES M. HLTON
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Mortgages-Obligation Requirement. In Koster v. Wingard, 50 Wn.2d 855, 314
P.2d 928 (1957), the court refused to accept the plaintiff's contention that an equitable
mortgage was created by the acts of the parties. During the course of the opinion the
court stated that "... a mortgage can not exist without a debt, and that debt must be
identified and the amount fixed with certainty." Since the court needed only to decide
whether the alleged equitable mortgage was actually supported by an obligation, the
court's language was broader than required by the issue before it. The Washington
court has previously used the language "a mortgage cannot exist without a debt" in
other situations where the case did not require the statement of so broad a rule. Hays
v. Bashor, 108 Wash. 491, 185 Pac. 814 (1919) ; Tesdahl v. Collins, 2 Wn.2d 76, 97
P.2d 649 (1939) ; O'Reilly v. Tillman, 111 Wash. 594, 191 Pac. 866 (1920).
The court in Koster v. Wingard, supra, may have meant to state a general require-
ment for both equitable and legal mortgages that if the obligation for which the
mortgage is given fails for some reason, the mortgage is not enforceable. WALSH,
MORTGAGES 74 (1934); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 74 (1951); Osborne § 103 (1951); 3
GLENN, MORTGAGES § 396-97 (1943). In stating the requirement as broadly as it did,
the court would apparently invaliadet gift mortgages, mortgages given for advances to
be made in the future, and those mortgages which secure unliquidated debts. There is a
considerable amount of authority to support the proposition that money need not be
27 See Prizity; Property Damages; and Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal. note
8, supra.
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advanced when the mortgage is given and also that the debt need not be ascertained with
certainty. 3 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 396-97 (1943); OsBORNE, MORTGAGES § 105, 113
(1951) ; WALSH, MORTGAGES 77 (1934). Moreover, there is some authority for the
proposition that gift mortgages are valid. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 5.6 (1943) ; OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES § 104 (1951) ; WALSH, MORTGAGES 74 (1934).
Since the court has created doubt about the validity of the aforementioned transac-
tions, their exact position in this state will be difficult to determine until further deci-
sions have been handed down.
Chattel Mortgages Executed In Foreign Jurisdictions-Their Validity-Rights of
Creditors With Regard Thereto. In Isaacs v. Mack Motor Truck Corp., 50 Wn.2d
325, 311 P.2d 663 (1957), the defendant sold a truck to the Robb & Skov Logging Co.
in Oregon. To secure the balance of the purchase price the defendant executed a
chattel mortgage on the truck. The mortgage was duly filed in Oregon under the
Oregon statute, which does not require an affiidavit of good faith as does the Wash-
ington statute. Subsequently, the logging company moved the truck from Oregon to
Washington. The plaintiffs are Washington creditors of the logging company who
sued to enjoin a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage by the defendant.
The superior court was of the opinion that the mortgage was invalid because the
defendant had not filed an affidavit of good faith as required by RCW 61.04.020. The
supreme court reversed, holding that a chattel mortgage executed in a foreign juris-
diction remained valid in this state even if it had not been executed with the formalities
required by the Washington statute. However, the court held that such a chattel
mortgage would not be superior to the liens of attaching creditors who rendered serv-
ices without notice of the mortgage, unless the property had been removed from its
original jurisdiction without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee, and unless
the mortgagee had exercised reasonable diligence in complying with the filing laws
of the new jurisdiction or had proceeded to assert his rights when he had learned
of the mortgaged property's whereabouts. Since the superior court had not made these
fact findings, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
195s]
